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Summary of Findings
San Diego has long been a geographically well-defined health 
care market with high managed care penetration and a consol-
idated provider sector. In recent years, hospital systems have 
faced increasing cost pressures as commercial health plans 
have responded to employer demands for more affordable 
premiums by offering limited-network health maintenance 
organization (HMO) and high-deductible preferred provider 
organization (PPO) products. In the health care safety net 
for low-income people, providers expanded capacity to deal 
with the large Medi-Cal expansion that began in 2014, but 
continue to grapple with how to provide adequate care for a 
new enrollee population that is far sicker, with more complex 
medical and social service needs, than their previous patient 
base.
Key developments include:
▶▶ Market positions shifting slightly among major hospi-
tal systems. The hospital market remained largely stable 
in recent years, with no major closures, acquisitions, or 
affiliation changes. However, the competitive positions 
of the two largest systems did change somewhat, with 
Sharp Healthcare gaining and Scripps Health losing both 
inpatient and outpatient market share. Payers’ increasing 
emphasis on provider affordability and value has strength-
ened Sharp’s market position, while it created challenges 
for Scripps — historically a higher-cost system. Despite 
cost pressures, both systems continue to achieve strong 
financial performance, as has Kaiser Permanente. Kaiser’s 
presence in the market is growing, with its health plan 
now covering one in five insured county residents. UC San 
Diego Health (UCSD) has increased both patient volume 
and financial margins in recent years, in part by expand-
ing affiliations with community providers to gain more 
tertiary referrals. In contrast, most of the smaller hospitals 
have been losing volume and struggling financially; some 
also lack the major capital needed to comply with state 
seismic regulations, raising doubts about their future.
▶▶ Major systems pursuing population health strategies. 
Kaiser, Sharp, and Scripps are building countywide 
networks that can manage care efficiently enough to 
compete vigorously for coveted commercial and Medicare 
Advantage patients. While Kaiser and Sharp have long 
focused on these approaches, population health represents 
a major strategic shift for Scripps. Systems are increasingly 
using provider-sponsored health plans to take full risk for 
more patients; Sharp’s long-established plan expanded its 
market presence in 2014, while Scripps obtained an insur-
ance license in 2015. These systems all have expanded 
their clinical footprints into areas of the county where they 
had little or no previous presence — most notably the fast-
growing North Inland region. These expansions have been 
focused on development of ambulatory facilities and ser-
vices, with the aim of increasing access and convenience 
for patients and reducing costs for the systems.
2▶▶ Private practice increasingly less viable for physicians, 
particularly in primary care. Low reimbursement from 
public and private payers, along with the long and unpre-
dictable work hours required in independent practice, are 
leading many primary care physicians (PCPs) to choose 
employment at system-affiliated groups over the auton-
omy of small practices. This trend, also present in other 
California markets, poses a threat to independent practice 
associations (IPAs), with many seeing a decline in their 
PCP membership base and commercial HMO volume. 
However, the market’s largest IPA, Sharp Community 
Medical Group, has been able to adjust successfully so far, 
by expanding geographically and adding sizable primary 
care practices as members. To accommodate PCPs seeking 
the stability and security of employment but reluctant 
to join a large group, Sharp is launching a new practice 
model, SharpCare Medical Group, whose members will 
practice in relatively small, community-based settings and 
will belong to the Sharp Community Medical Group IPA 
for managed care contracting.
▶▶ Large Medi-Cal expansion exposes safety-net access 
gaps. In the two years since Medicaid eligibility was 
first expanded under the ACA, San Diego’s Medi-Cal 
managed care enrollment almost doubled, to a total of 
nearly 700,000. The county’s strong, stable network of 
community clinics increased their capacity substantially 
to prepare for surging demand from the expansion. As 
a result, although clinics did face primary care capac-
ity constraints, these appeared less severe than in some 
other California communities. However, many Medi-Cal 
enrollees without a regular primary care provider sought 
care at hospital emergency departments (EDs). Access 
gaps for many kinds of specialty care and behavioral health 
care were more severe, reflecting not only the shortage of 
many of these providers in the county overall, but also the 
lack of willingness among many providers to accept low 
Medi-Cal payment rates, and the multiple, complex, and 
challenging health needs of many new Medi-Cal enrollees.
▶▶ Community clinics increasingly collaborating among 
themselves and with hospitals. Twelve Federally Qualified 
Health Centers (FQHCs) belonging to San Diego’s clinic 
consortium recently announced a collaboration, Integrated 
Health Partners of Southern California, that will conduct 
unified contracting with Medi-Cal managed care plans 
and aim to build a clinically integrated network with the 
goal of improving quality and efficiency. With the state 
expected to replace its current method for paying FQHCs 
with a new capitated approach over the next few years, the 
new partnership is an effort to prepare the diverse group of 
clinics to assume financial risk for patient care. Individual 
FQHCs continue to form — or at least explore — more 
collaborations with hospitals; several of these joint efforts 
are focused on linking low-income hospital patients to 
sources of primary care as a way to relieve hospital ED 
overuse and prevent avoidable readmissions. 
▶▶ Mixed views of county government’s safety-net role. 
San Diego County’s commitment to providing health 
care for low-income residents has long been limited. The 
county sets stringent eligibility criteria for subsidized 
health services, and it operates neither a county-run hos-
pital nor primary care clinics. While the county provides 
both inpatient and outpatient behavioral health services 
for low-income residents, hospital systems expressed frus-
tration that the county’s limited funding for these services 
has shifted costs onto their own organizations. In recent 
years, the county Health and Human Services Agency 
(HHSA) has played an increasing role in collaborations to 
improve health care for low-income people, including ini-
tiatives to link health services with related social services, 
such as food and housing. Some HHSA collaborations 
extend beyond the safety net, including a joint effort with 
local hospital systems to reduce readmissions among high-
risk Medicare beneficiaries.
3Market Background
San Diego County occupies an area of more 
than 4,500 square miles, with well-defined geo-
graphic boundaries: the Pacific Ocean to the 
west, Mexico to the south, the desert to the east, 
and Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton to the 
north (see map on page 23). With 3.3 million 
residents, it is California’s second most populous 
county. The county’s population grew by 11% 
over the past decade, moderately faster than the 
state’s average growth rate.
San Diego is somewhat less racially and eth-
nically diverse than the state as a whole, with a 
higher proportion of white residents and lower 
proportions of Latino, Asian, and foreign-born 
residents. County residents have moderately 
higher education and income levels, on average, 
than state residents. In recent years, the county’s 
unemployment rate consistently has been lower 
than California’s overall rate by more than a full 
percentage point. (See Table 1.)
The county’s health insurance coverage mix 
is slightly more favorable than the state average. 
However, from 2007 to 2014, the proportion of 
San Diego residents covered by private insurance 
declined substantially, from 63.9% to 53.8%. 
The key factors driving this trend include the 
ACA making many low-income residents eligi-
ble for Medi-Cal, an aging population becoming 
increasingly eligible for Medicare, and employer-
sponsored coverage eroding during the major 
recession of the late 2000s and not completely 
recovering afterward.
While San Diego is more affluent than 
California overall, large socioeconomic dispari-
ties exist within the county. Generally, northern 
regions of the county are much more prosper-
ous than the central city and southern regions. 
Table 1.  Demographic and Health System Characteristics: San Diego vs. California
San Diego California
POPULATION STATISTICS, 2014
Total population 3,263,431 38,802,500
Population growth, 10-year 11.2% 9.1%
Population growth, 5-year 6.9% 5.0%
AGE OF POPULATION, 2014
Under 5 years old 6.7% 6.6%
Under 18 years old 23.5% 24.1%
18 to 64 years old 61.5% 63.1%
65 years and older 15.0% 12.9%
RACE/ETHNICITY, 2014
Asian non-Latino 10.2% 13.3%
Black non-Latino 4.7% 5.5%
Latino 33.2% 38.9%
White non-Latino 47.2% 38.8%
Other race non-Latino 4.7% 3.5%
Foreign-born 25.5% 28.5%
EDUCATION, 2014
High school diploma or higher, adults 25 and older 86.8% 83.4%
College degree or higher, adults 25 and older 40.5% 37.9%
HEALTH STATUS, 2014
Fair/poor health 14.1% 17.1%
Diabetes 6.9% 8.9%
Asthma 15.6% 14.0%
Heart disease, adults 5.6% 6.1%
ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2014
Below 100% federal poverty level 16.7% 18.4%
Below 200% federal poverty level 37.3% 40.7%
Household income above $100,000 22.3% 22.9%
Unemployment rate 6.4% 7.5%
HEALTH INSURANCE, ALL AGES, 2014
Private insurance 53.8% 51.2%
Medicare 11.9% 10.4%
Medi-Cal and other public programs 23.6% 26.5%
Uninsured 10.7% 11.9%
PHYSICIANS PER 100,000 POPULATION, 2011
Physicians 211 194
Primary care physicians 64 64
Specialists 147 130
HOSPITALS, 2014
Community, acute care hospital beds per 100,000 population† 155.6 181.8
Operating margin, acute care hospitals* 7.8% 3.8%
Occupancy rate for licensed acute care beds† 58.2% 53.0%
Average length of stay, in days† 4.3 4.4
Paid full-time equivalents per 1,000 adjusted patient days* 16.1 16.6
Total operating expense per adjusted patient day* $3,179 $3,417
*Kaiser excluded. 
†Kaiser included.
Sources: US Census Bureau, 2014; California Health Interview Survey, 2014; “Monthly Labor Force Data for California Counties and 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2014” (data not seasonally adjusted), State of California Employment Development Department; “California 
Physicians: Supply or Scarcity?” California Health Care Foundation, March 2014; Annual Financial Data, California Office of Statewide 
Health Planning and Development, 2014.
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Services Agency, ranked from most to least affluent, are:
▶▶ North Central (also popularly known as Central 
Coastal). Includes coastal community of La Jolla. 
Wealthy, well insured.
▶▶ North Coastal and North Inland. Not as wealthy as 
La Jolla, but generally affluent and well insured. North 
Inland reportedly has fastest-growing population in 
the county.
▶▶ East. Middle-of-the-road on economic indicators, 
also fast growing.
▶▶ South. High rates of poverty and uninsured; highest 
proportion of Latino residents. Community of 
National City has highest unemployment rate in the 
county.
▶▶ Central. Includes core urban areas of the city of San 
Diego. Highest rates of poverty and uninsured; highest 
proportion of African American residents; very diverse 
region containing areas of wealth and affluence as well 
as poverty.
Incremental Competitive Changes Within Largely 
Stable Hospital Market
Strong, well-established systems continue to anchor San 
Diego’s hospital sector, which has been defined largely by its 
stability. No major closures, acquisitions, or other organiza-
tional changes took place over the past few years.1 The hospital 
sector is characterized by substantial consolidation: Its two 
largest systems — Sharp Health Care and Scripps Health — 
each with four general acute care hospitals, accounted for 
30% and 26%, respectively, of inpatient discharges in 2014.2, 3 
The county’s next-largest systems have a much more limited 
inpatient presence: UC San Diego Health (UCSD) had 11% 
of inpatient discharges in 2014, while Kaiser Permanente and 
Palomar Health, a district hospital system in the North Inland 
region, each accounted for 9%. Smaller inpatient facilities 
include Rady Children’s Hospital, which dominates inpatient 
pediatrics; Tri-City Medical Center, a district hospital in the 
North Coastal region; and for-profit Prime Health Care’s two 
hospitals, Alvarado and Paradise Valley.
Although the hospital sector has been largely stable, a 
gradual shift in market positions between the two dominant 
systems has taken place in recent years. Sharp’s share of both 
inpatient and outpatient volume increased, while Scripps’ 
share declined. Sharp, which has long embraced capitation 
and its role as a lower-cost, more integrated delivery system, 
has seen its market position strengthening as both public and 
private payers have increasingly emphasized provider afford-
ability and value in recent years. Those same market forces 
have created challenges for Scripps, historically a higher-cost 
provider that thrived under fee-for-service payment. (See 
Sharp and Scripps sections below for more detail.) 
Kaiser’s presence in the San Diego market has expanded in 
recent years, as enrollment in its health plan grew significantly. 
About one in five insured county residents is estimated to have 
Kaiser coverage, and the proportion is higher for the coveted 
commercially insured population. Kaiser’s growing market 
presence is not reflected in its share of inpatient volume, 
which has declined as its share of health plan enrollment has 
increased. In part, this disconnect stems from Kaiser’s policy 
of continuing to outsource a significant volume of inpatient 
services to other systems, most notably cardiac surgery to 
Scripps and general inpatient beds to Palomar. A broader 
reason for the disconnect is that Kaiser’s business model does 
not rely on inpatient facilities to drive profits, as is the case 
under fee for service; instead, its hospitals serve as cost centers 
in a model where Kaiser’s health plan takes full financial risk. 
As a result, Kaiser continuously seeks to improve on already 
efficient hospital utilization and has been able to do this while 
it expands health plan enrollment.
Along with Sharp, UCSD has seen its share of both inpa-
tient and outpatient volume increasing in recent years. After 
long functioning as a standalone academic medical center, 
5in recent years UCSD has stepped up efforts to collaborate 
with community providers — both physician organizations 
and smaller community hospitals — a strategy that report-
edly has helped boost tertiary referrals to the UCSD system. 
UCSD’s first affiliation — with Rady Children’s Hospital and 
its network of pediatric specialists — dates back to the early 
2000s and was tightened in the late 2000s. More recently, 
UCSD has formed affiliations with Eisenhower Medical 
Center and El Centro Regional Medical Center in neigh-
boring Riverside and Imperial Counties, respectively, and 
Tri-City Medical Center in San Diego County (see below). 
Large Systems Fare Well Financially, While Most Smaller 
Hospitals Struggle
Despite significant consolidation, the San Diego hospital 
sector historically has been characterized by relatively low 
hospital unit prices, according to market observers. They 
attributed this in part to the local economy being largely 
composed of small to mid-sized firms that one market expert 
described as “very price-conscious . . . [because] for the most 
part, you’ve never had concentrations of high-margin, high-
wage [businesses] here that you see in . . . San Francisco or 
Silicon Valley.” As a result, San Diego’s commercial insurance 
sector has never tended to be a “pass-through environment” 
in which payment rate increases to providers can easily be 
passed on to employers as premium increases of the same 
magnitude. Compounding these rate pressures from private 
purchasers and payers have been low Medicare and Medi-Cal 
payment rates. 
Hospital executives reported that payers were continuing 
to exert downward pressure on rates and described having to 
make concerted, ongoing efforts to reduce both clinical and 
administrative expenses in order to achieve positive financial 
results. Despite those pressures, however, San Diego’s largest 
systems continued to turn in impressive hospital operat-
ing margins in 2014, the most recent year for which public 
data are available from the state. Scripps — which has long 
achieved high margins — continued that trend in 2014, with 
a margin of 12.3%.4 Sharp’s margins, which were modest in 
the late 2000s, have improved markedly over the past five 
years or so. Its 2014 margin of 10.8% was in line with recent 
performance. After several years of breaking even or running 
deficits, UCSD achieved a margin of 6.6% in 2014 — not 
on par with the two dominant systems, but still robust.5 
Kaiser does not report financial results at either the individual 
hospital or local market level, but the system as a whole has 
achieved strong financial performance for several years in a 
row while increasing health plan enrollment.
In contrast to the large systems, most of the smaller hos-
pitals have experienced financial struggles to varying degrees. 
The lone exception was Rady Children’s Hospital, which 
continued to leverage its dominant position in inpatient 
pediatrics to achieve a 9% margin in 2014. Palomar’s perfor-
mance has fluctuated: After four straight years of achieving 
operating surpluses, the system reported deficits in 2013 and 
2014 (3.7% and 0.9%, respectively). Multiple respondents 
suggested that Palomar had overextended itself in building 
a third hospital, which opened in 2012, and had too many 
inpatient beds. In a move aimed at rightsizing the system and 
reducing its cost structure, Palomar’s board voted in mid-
2015 to close Palomar’s old hospital (the original Palomar 
Medical Center) in downtown Escondido and move its ser-
vices to the system’s remaining two hospitals, primarily to the 
new Palomar Medical Center in west Escondido. 
Despite its recent mixed financial performance, Palomar’s 
position is still stronger than those of other small hospitals 
in the market, in large part because its two hospitals occupy 
the North Inland submarket, which has no other inpatient 
facilities and is home to a fast-growing commercially insured 
population. One result is that Palomar has an ongoing con-
tract to supply more than 100 inpatient beds to Kaiser at 
Palomar Medical Center. Palomar also benefits from an 
affiliation with the county’s largest IPA, Sharp Community 
Medical Group, which has expanded its North Inland pres-
ence in recent years and participates in managed care contracts 
alongside Palomar (see below). One potential concern for 
6Palomar is that Kaiser’s North County enrollment may grow 
enough that Kaiser decides to build its own hospital in the 
area, perhaps within the next decade.6 The loss of the Kaiser 
contract would pose a serious setback for Palomar, according 
to market observers. 
The other small hospitals — Tri-City and Prime Health 
Care — both reported operating deficits of around 4% in 
2014, after several years mostly running deficits of varying 
magnitude. In recent years, Tri-City has lost volume to larger 
rivals — most notably Scripps and Palomar, which both 
operate hospitals in adjacent service areas and have expanded 
physician networks and ambulatory facilities into Tri-City’s 
service area. In late 2015, Tri-City announced an affiliation 
with UCSD, surprising some market observers who believed 
a partnership with Scripps or Sharp might be a better fit. Tri-
City has been facing management turmoil, with its board 
voting in March 2016 to oust the CEO, who had held the 
position for less than two years, and to elevate the CFO to 
that role.7
Prime’s business model reportedly has long involved 
avoiding contracts with commercial health plans, instead cap-
italizing off of high billed charges to those plans when Prime 
hospitals “capture” their patients through emergency admis-
sions. Recently, health plans and capitated providers have 
become much more proactive in repatriating their patients 
from Prime facilities back to the hospitals in their own net-
works — a development that one observer suggested might 
be a key factor behind Prime’s weakening financial perfor-
mance. Another observer noted that Prime recently has been 
seeking more health plan contracts, a reversal of its longstand-
ing approach. 
Seismic compliance issues loom large for Tri-City and 
Prime’s two hospitals. Neither of these hospitals meet seismic 
standards beyond 2030. The amount of capital needed to 
make them compliant appears prohibitive for both systems 
and would likely act as a major deterrent to acquisition as 
well. Voters in Tri-City’s district reportedly twice rejected 
bond issues to finance construction to meet seismic standards. 
Market observers suggested that keeping these inpatient facil-
ities open beyond 2030 might be possible only if the state 
relaxes its current seismic requirements.
New Inpatient Facilities Come Online
Most hospital systems in the region either recently completed 
construction or are currently engaged in construction, partly 
to meet seismic requirements and partly to pursue other 
major strategies such as enhancing key service lines. Palomar 
became the first system in San Diego to meet full seismic 
compliance when it opened the new Palomar Medical Center 
in west Escondido in 2012. Other notable construction proj-
ects include Scripps’ Prebys Cardiovascular Institute, which 
opened in 2015 and became the main facility for one of the 
system’s highest-priority service lines, combining cardiac 
services previously provided at two other Scripps hospitals. 
Kaiser members make up a large share of Prebys patients, 
reflecting a long-term arrangement under which all of Kaiser’s 
cardiac surgery needs are provided by Scripps. Slated to open 
in late 2016 is UCSD’s new Jacobs Medical Center, which 
will house three specialty hospitals under one roof: advanced 
surgery, cancer care, and women and infants. The new facility 
is located on UCSD’s Thornton campus in wealthy La Jolla, 
where UCSD has been expanding since 2008. UCSD has con-
currently reduced services on its Hillcrest campus in central 
San Diego, a service area with a far less favorable payer mix. 
Sharp has been renovating and upgrading several facilities, 
including converting its Mary Birch Hospital for Women & 
Newborns to all private rooms. Sharp Grossmont Hospital (a 
district hospital in East County operated by Sharp) is under-
going extensive taxpayer-financed expansions. These include 
the construction of a new Heart & Vascular Center, sched-
uled for completion in late 2016, and a new surgical floor, 
slated to open in 2018. Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center 
will undergo a major expansion, with its new Ocean View 
Tower, featuring private patient rooms and high-tech operat-
ing rooms, scheduled to open in 2020.
7Kaiser is building its second hospital in the county: a 
550-bed facility in Kearny Mesa, scheduled to open in early 
2017. The new hospital supports Kaiser’s growing health plan 
enrollment, which topped 600,000 in early 2016. Kaiser’s 
overall plan for San Diego reportedly calls for a total of three 
hospitals in the county by 2030. When the new Kearny 
Mesa hospital opens, some services from Kaiser’s existing 
hospital (commonly known as Zion) will be relocated to the 
new hospital, and Zion will undergo major renovation, with 
all its rooms converted to private rooms. As of early 2016, 
Kaiser had not announced whether any of its currently out-
sourced services would be brought in-house after the new 
hospital opens. Most observers expected Kaiser to continue 
using Palomar for inpatient beds because of the significant 
distance and travel time between Kearny Mesa and most of 
the North County locations where Kaiser members are con-
centrated. Kaiser’s contract with Scripps for cardiac surgery 
runs through 2020; if Kaiser were to decide to in-source this 
service, it would first need to hire its own cardiac surgeons, 
then have them practice at Scripps for a period of time before 
moving the service line (along with related interventional car-
diology services currently performed by Kaiser physicians at 
Prebys) to the Kearny Mesa facility. 
San Diego historically has been considered an under-bed-
ded community, but some observers have suggested that the 
recent spate of hospital construction might be moving the 
market in the opposite direction toward at least some excess 
capacity. However, the overall net impact on bed capacity 
remains highly uncertain, in part because the systems have 
not made final decisions on what to do with their old capac-
ity as new construction comes on line. Those determinations 
depend, in turn, on whether the state decides to relax its 
current seismic standards, as many providers and observers 
expect it to do. 
Systems Focus on Ambulatory Expansions
Despite the high-profile launch of some new inpatient 
facilities, most hospital systems have been more focused on 
expanding their presence in a wide variety of ambulatory 
settings. This shifting emphasis from inpatient to ambula-
tory care — driven by changes in both medical technology 
and payment incentives — is consistent with trends seen in 
markets elsewhere across the state and the country. In San 
Diego, the large systems — Sharp, Scripps, and Kaiser — 
also have been expanding their clinical footprints to cover 
areas of the county where their presence had been limited 
until recently. These geographic expansions have helped 
serve the systems’ population health strategies (see “Systems 
Pursue Population Health Strategies” below) and include the 
development of physician networks by acquiring practices 
outright as well as forming affiliations with existing physi-
cian organizations (see “Large System-Affiliated Physician 
Groups Continue to Grow” below). Systems also have been 
very active in building, expanding, or acquiring a wide variety 
of ambulatory facilities, ranging from medical office build-
ings to urgent care centers, ambulatory surgery centers, and 
imaging facilities. 
In recent years, San Diego’s hospital systems have intro-
duced several different forms of convenience care, most 
notably retail health clinics. One market observer noted that 
systems appear to be pursuing retail-based strategies to a 
greater extent in San Diego than elsewhere. Since Palomar first 
partnered with the Albertsons retail chain in 2008 to operate 
Palomar Health Expresscare clinics inside Albertsons/Sav-on 
Pharmacy stores, Sharp affiliated with CVS/MinuteClinic 
in 2013, and Kaiser with Target in 2014. Scripps, which 
launched its first convenience clinic in late 2015, is taking a 
different approach: Instead of partnering with a retail chain, 
it teamed up with a commercial real estate firm, The Irvine 
Company, to open a Scripps HealthExpress clinic — perhaps 
the first of several — in an office tower across the street from 
a large shopping mall. The new clinic is slated to offer corpo-
rate wellness services as well as the usual set of convenience 
8care services.8 The Irvine Company’s clinic arrangement with 
Scripps is similar to partnerships the company has formed 
with other prominent providers elsewhere in California, 
including Stanford Health in Santa Clara and St. Joseph 
Hoag Health in Orange County. 
Kaiser has been particularly active in introducing new 
types of convenience care to the market. In addition to its 
retail clinics in Target stores, Kaiser operates a mobile clinic 
called a Mobile Health Vehicle: a truck equipped to provide 
full primary care office visits as well as services such as basic 
chronic care management, lab work, and biometric screen-
ings. Like Mobile Health Vehicles operated in Kaiser’s other 
major Southern California markets, the truck pays regular 
visits to the offices of large Kaiser corporate accounts, allow-
ing employees to attend to routine health needs without 
leaving their workplace. The truck also makes regular stops in 
areas of the county not located near a Kaiser primary care site, 
where enrollees would otherwise have to drive a fair distance 
to seek routine care. 
Expanding their ambulatory presence allows San Diego’s 
hospital systems to pursue multiple strategies, including 
better competing for patients on the basis of convenience and 
access and, in many cases, reducing the system’s clinical cost 
structure. An example of the latter is Scripps’ 2015 acquisi-
tion of Imaging Healthcare Specialists (IHS), a chain of eight 
freestanding radiology centers. In the past, systems typically 
bought such ambulatory facilities in pursuit of a fee-for-ser-
vice strategy: The acquired facilities would become part of the 
system’s hospital outpatient department, thus allowing the 
system to charge a higher rate to payers for the same service 
than a freestanding facility could charge. After the recent 
acquisition, however, Scripps is taking a different approach: 
continuing to operate IHS as freestanding facilities, using the 
same independent radiologists who had previously staffed 
these facilities. Maintaining the lower cost structure should 
help Scripps manage the total cost of care for the growing 
number of patients for whom it will be taking on financial risk 
(see “Systems Pursue Population Health Strategies” below). 
This approach also helps the system better compete for the 
many patients covered by high-deductible health plans, who 
have strong incentives to keep their own out-of-pocket costs 
low by price-shopping among providers. Scripps’ move is 
similar to those recently adopted by traditionally high-priced 
providers in other markets to reduce their ambulatory cost 
structure. 
Large System-Affiliated Physician Groups Continue 
to Grow
Many San Diego physicians have long practiced in large 
medical groups, each aligned exclusively with one of the major 
systems. Kaiser’s Southern California Permanente Medical 
Group is the largest, employing more than 1,000 physicians 
and operating 25 ambulatory centers throughout San Diego 
County. In the UCSD system, physicians are employed by the 
university and belong to the UCSD Medical Group. Because 
a portion of their time is devoted to research and teaching, 
these physicians represent significantly fewer clinical full-time 
equivalents than the total count of approximately 750.
The other large systems continue to rely on the medical 
foundation model to align physicians with their systems.9 
Sharp’s foundation currently contracts exclusively with one 
large multispecialty group, Sharp Rees-Stealy Medical Group 
(SRS), and one small group consisting of Sharp’s cardiac sur-
geons. At SRS, which has about 500 physicians practicing 
in 21 ambulatory centers, physicians typically refer patients 
to other physicians within the group. Scripps’ foundation 
contracts with multiple groups, the largest being Scripps 
Clinic Medical Group, with more than 600 physicians. 
Other groups in Scripps’ foundation include Scripps Coastal 
Medical Center, with more than 100 PCPs at nine sites, and 
separate groups consisting of Scripps’ cardiac surgeons and 
hospitalists. Palomar’s foundation, Arch Health Partners, is 
much newer and smaller. Launched in 2010, its physician 
members now total more than 60, and it belongs to San 
Diego’s largest IPA, Sharp Community Medical Group (see 
below), for HMO contracting. 
9Over the past few years, San Diego’s large groups all con-
tinued to grow, especially in their PCP ranks. As in other 
markets, this trend has been driven in part by the preference 
of most new physicians — particularly PCPs — for the stabil-
ity, security, and predictable work hours of the employment 
model over the autonomy of private practice. In addition, 
many PCPs currently in private practice are finding that busi-
ness model increasingly less viable, and some are making the 
transition to system-affiliated groups. Indeed, systems have 
reported increasingly being approached by independent prac-
titioners interested in being acquired. 
Driving this trend has been the slow erosion of the capi-
tated HMO model, which continued to lose ground to 
high-deductible PPOs in the commercial sector. Financially, 
physician organizations have always fared worse under PPO 
fee schedules than HMO capitation. PPO rates paid by com-
mercial health plans to small independent practices were 
described as “horrible” by multiple physician executives. One 
respondent noted that “commercial [PPO] rates are below 
Medicare [rates] . . . and San Diego has the lowest Medicare 
rates in the state.” (San Diego’s low Medicare payment rates 
stem from its designation as a rural locality by the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) — a designation 
that is scheduled to change in 2017, resulting in an expected 
payment boost of 6% to 9%.)10 Capitation has long been the 
“lifeblood of independent physicians,” according to a physi-
cian executive, who suggested that if commercial PPOs keep 
gaining ground on network-model HMOs, “it will put every 
single [small practice] out of business.” More recently, finan-
cial pressures on small practices have been compounded by 
the passage of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization 
Act of 2015 (MACRA), which will replace Medicare’s current 
method for paying physicians with a new Quality Payment 
Program.11
Some systems are recognizing the need to find new 
approaches for aligning the many independent PCPs who are 
now seeking employment options. Sharp has begun forming 
a new medical group, SharpCare Medical Group, under its 
foundation. Organized along very different lines than Sharp 
Rees-Stealy’s large integrated group model, SharpCare aims 
to retain some key attributes of small, community-based 
practices that many independent physicians are reluctant to 
give up, while also offering physicians the security and sta-
bility of employment. Members would practice in relatively 
small primary care offices with only about 3 to 10 practi-
tioners per site and would be able to continue referring 
patients to community-based specialists. At the same time, 
they would receive clinical support from the Sharp system 
— for example, from care managers, pharmacists, and other 
clinicians, rotating among the primary care sites. Within the 
Sharp system, SharpCare would be most closely aligned with 
Sharp Community Medical Group, the IPA, and would be a 
member of the IPA for HMO contracting and accountable 
care organization (ACO) participation. Fee for service PPO 
contracting for the new group will be done through Sharp 
Healthcare, which should have the leverage to obtain better 
rates than small practices would have received.
Changing Market Conditions Pose Major Challenges for IPAs
IPAs historically have played a central role in San Diego’s 
health care market, given the county’s dual characteristics of 
high managed care penetration and a significant proportion of 
physicians practicing in small, independent practices (which 
rely on IPAs for HMO contracting and practice support). The 
recent, continuing decline of this small, independent practice 
model — especially in primary care — means that IPAs are 
facing what one physician executive describes as an existential 
threat as well. If current trends continue, IPAs inevitably will 
experience declining membership that is increasingly skewed 
toward specialists and older physicians. In recent years, most 
IPAs have lost a substantial number of commercial HMO 
lives as a result of network-model HMOs losing volume to 
high-deductible PPOs (mentioned above), as well as declin-
ing PCP membership in many IPAs. While most IPAs have 
aggressively pursued Medicare Advantage HMO contracts 
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over the past decade, the gains in enrollment there have not 
compensated for the loss of commercial HMO lives. 
Sharp Community Medical Group (SCMG), by far the 
largest IPA in San Diego, has been the most successful in 
adapting to market changes. Pursuing a long-term strategy to 
expand its footprint throughout the county, SCMG contin-
ued to grow both its membership (nearly 1,000 physicians) 
and HMO lives (107,000 commercial, 27,000 Medicare 
Advantage) over the past several years, bucking the down-
ward trend experienced by nearly all other IPAs. SCMG was 
able to increase its patient volume primarily by adding two 
sizable North County groups to its membership base: Arch 
Health Partners (Palomar’s foundation, with about 40 physi-
cians) and Graybill Medical Group (an independent group of 
about 50 physicians, also located in Palomar’s service area). 
Without the addition of these two groups, SCMG’s HMO 
lives would have declined. About 40% of SCMG’s members 
are now based in this submarket. 
Historically (and still) tightly aligned with the Sharp 
system, SCMG also developed an affiliation with Palomar 
as it expanded into the North Inland region, where Palomar 
operates the only hospitals. SCMG participates in HMO 
contracts with Palomar, along the same lines as its longstand-
ing arrangement with Sharp: SCMG holds its own HMO 
contracts, accepting professional risk; the hospital system 
assumes institutional risk; and the parties share a hospital risk 
pool.12
SCMG has adopted strategies aimed at accommodating 
physicians across a broad spectrum of practice preferences. 
As noted above, for PCPs choosing employment with a sys-
tem-affiliated group but still seeking the qualities of small, 
community-based practices, SCMG has partnered with 
Sharp Healthcare to develop the SharpCare Medical Group, 
which should provide a boost to SCMG’s physician mem-
bership and patient volume. For member practices choosing 
to remain independent but seeking more support, SCMG 
launched a practice management company to provide clini-
cal and administrative services. Some of SCMG’s largest 
members, including Graybill, are using the services of the 
new practice management company, which reportedly has 
been successful in helping practices run more efficiently and 
improving measures of financial performance such as income 
and cash flow.
SCMG also has been active in efforts to gain patient 
volume through diversification. Several years ago, it became 
the first IPA in San Diego to collaborate with health plans in 
commercial ACOs. Currently, it participates in three ACOs 
for a total of nearly 27,000 lives (see “Providers Expand 
Commercial ACO Participation, Despite Reservations” 
below). SCMG also has been developing a method for 
ranking its PCP members based on their patient-centered 
medical home capabilities and reportedly will market this 
tiered structure to health plans as a new “high-value network” 
product, with each tier corresponding to a different patient 
cost-sharing level.
Other IPAs in the market have far fewer physician 
members and HMO patients, and a more limited geographic 
footprint, than SCMG. They also tend to have less clinical 
integration and less product diversification, and most have 
struggled far more with declines in commercial HMO enroll-
ment. Among the several IPAs affiliated with Scripps, the 
largest is Mercy Physicians Medical Group (MPMG), with 
about 600 physicians, primarily specialists. Closely affiliated 
with Scripps Mercy, MPMG has about 24,000 HMO lives, 
split evenly between commercial and Medicare Advantage. At 
its peak, MPMG’s commercial HMO enrollment was twice as 
high as it is now. MPMG has remained independent to date, 
but reportedly, larger organizations — including both Scripps 
and MPMG’s own management company, North American 
Medical Management (NAMM) — have shown interest in 
acquiring it. NAMM already owns another, much smaller 
Scripps-affiliated IPA, Primary Care Associates Medical 
Group, located primarily in the North Coastal region.13 
In 2014, San Diego Physicians Medical Group, one of 
the market’s larger IPAs, formed an exclusive affiliation with 
Scripps when it joined with two smaller IPAs to form Scripps 
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Physicians Medical Group, with a total of more than 500 
physicians. In mid-2015, Scripps formed an affiliation with 
another IPA, MultiCultural Primary Care Medical Group. 
Tightening and expanding such affiliations is part of Scripps’ 
strategy to build up its physician networks as it makes a 
return to commercial capitation (see “Scripps Returns to 
Commercial Capitation” below).
Systems Pursue Population Health Strategies 
Population health management has long been a central strat-
egy for two of San Diego’s major systems. Kaiser’s model 
— an integrated delivery system and a health plan taking full 
financial risk for all patients — was described by one market 
observer as “the classic case of population health manage-
ment.” Among the non-Kaiser systems, Sharp stands out as 
having the highest degree of population health commitment 
and capabilities. Although Sharp, unlike Kaiser, does provide 
a significant amount of fee-for-service, volume-based care, 
the system has long focused on accepting full risk for patient 
care and managing care efficiently for that population within 
an integrated system. In contrast to Sharp, Scripps spurned 
commercial capitation in favor of fee-for-service strategies in 
the late 2000s, but over the past few years, it has reversed 
course in response to changing market conditions. Scripps is 
now pursuing commercial capitation and population health 
— a strategy that requires significant system transformation 
(see Scripps section below).
Sharp Health Plan Gains HMO Volume and Market Share
Since the early 1990s, Sharp has held a full insurance license, 
and the system has long offered HMO products under the 
Sharp Health Plan (SHP) brand in the commercial group 
market, predominantly to small and mid-sized local employ-
ers. By 2013, SHP’s group enrollment had reached about 
70,000, including several thousand in Sharp’s own workforce. 
It was in 2014 that the health plan gained greater visibility 
and substantially more enrollment when it entered two new 
market segments: the individual market (both on and off 
the Covered California public insurance exchange) and the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) 
market. After two years competing in those segments, SHP 
has gained traction in both, attaining a 17% share of Covered 
California enrollees, and a 20% share of CalPERS enrollees, 
living in San Diego County. It also has continued growing 
steadily in the small and mid-sized employer-sponsored seg-
ments in which it has long competed. In the small-group 
market, SHP has had notable success competing on the 
CaliforniaChoice private insurance exchange, where it has 
captured about 30% of all San Diego enrollees. Overall, SHP’s 
total group enrollment has reached 102,000, and its individ-
ual enrollment — both on and off the Covered California 
exchange — now tops 28,000. One market observer noted 
that “[SHP’s] figures barely register as a blip if you’re com-
paring them against the statewide [enrollment] totals . . . 
[but] that’s not the right metric to be looking at. . . . The 
only market they compete in is San Diego, and in this local 
market, they’re a force to be reckoned with.”
Like other providers sponsoring their own health plans, 
Sharp has been motivated by the opportunity to gain more 
HMO lives, to counteract the commercial market trend 
toward PPO products. As noted above, physician practices, in 
general, fare much better financially under HMO capitation 
than PPO fee schedules. Because of Sharp’s clinical integra-
tion and care management capabilities, the system’s physician 
organizations, SRS and SCMG, reportedly have done espe-
cially well under capitation. And, unlike some California 
providers whose experience with capitation has been largely 
limited to professional risk, Sharp has long embraced the 
full-risk model, including assumption of risk for inpatient 
utilization and costs. As a result, using its own health plan 
to compete for patients suits Sharp’s care delivery model par-
ticularly well. 
Not all of Sharp Health Plan’s new enrollment represents 
patients new to the Sharp system. Some new SHP enrollees 
already were using Sharp’s physician network under previous 
coverage from other plans. Nevertheless, for providers like 
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Sharp, there are clear benefits to enrolling these patients in a 
plan sponsored by the system itself rather than by an exter-
nal health plan. One benefit is the ability to retain the total 
savings from care management efficiencies within the system, 
instead of having to share the savings with external health 
plans. Other benefits include control over insurance product 
design and pricing, as well as customer service. 
In addition to gaining significant enrollment in all the 
market segments it has entered, SHP has performed well on 
ratings of member satisfaction and health plan quality. In 
the 2015 health plan ratings by the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance (NCQA), SHP outperformed all commer-
cial plans in California on consumer satisfaction, and trailed 
only Kaiser on overall commercial plan ratings.14 A market 
observer commented that “[SHP] is a different model than 
Kaiser, but the two [plans] are similar in that they’ve both 
found combinations of affordability, . . . quality, [and] con-
sumer experience that work well for a lot of people.”
Scripps Returns to Commercial Capitation, Launches Its Own 
Health Plan
As noted above, in the late 2000s, Scripps made the strate-
gic decision to abandon capitation in favor of fee-for-service 
payments in all of its commercial HMO contracts. This shift 
was motivated by Scripps’ belief that sicker HMO patients 
were disproportionately choosing Scripps providers, in large 
part because of Scripps Clinic’s strong capabilities and reputa-
tion in high-end tertiary services. Unlike Medicare Advantage 
payments, commercial capitation payments are not risk-
adjusted, thus financially disadvantaging capitated providers 
who attract a less healthy patient mix. (Scripps continued 
accepting both professional and institutional risk in Medicare 
Advantage.)
The timing of Scripps’ move away from commercial capi-
tation coincided with a major economic recession, which put 
intense pressure on San Diego health plans and employers 
to find more affordable insurance coverage options. Health 
plans responded by rolling out products that charged lower 
premiums in exchange for restricted provider choice, and 
many local employers showed much greater willingness to 
adopt these products than they had in the past. The limited 
provider networks either excluded Scripps outright or rel-
egated it to a higher cost-sharing tier. In introducing these 
network changes, plans were reacting not only to the fee-for-
service method used in Scripps contracts but also to the high 
fee-for-service rates charged by the system. Enough employ-
ers adopted the new limited-network products that Scripps 
began losing commercial HMO volume, primarily to Sharp. 
The need for providers to compete on affordability and 
value was reinforced when the ACA became law in 2010, 
establishing the public insurance marketplaces. The design 
and structure of these marketplaces gives individual consum-
ers strong incentive and ability to price-shop among insurance 
products, while also encouraging participating plans to keep 
premiums low by excluding high-priced providers from their 
networks. In response to these changing market forces, Scripps 
began changing course strategically and turning back to com-
mercial capitation. In 2011, the system began approaching 
commercial plans about returning to capitation but with one 
major proposed change: risk adjusting payments to correct 
for adverse selection — an unprecedented approach in com-
mercial HMO contracts. Eventually, most of the commercial 
plans contracting with Scripps agreed to try retrospective risk 
adjustment on an experimental basis, and between 2012 and 
2014, all but one of Scripps’ commercial HMO contracts 
transitioned from fee for service to risk-adjusted, capitated 
payment.15 
While the concept and the logic behind risk-adjusted 
payments were compelling, the actual implementation was 
described by respondents familiar with the process as a sig-
nificant operational challenge fraught with major data gaps 
and other serious administrative problems. The main issue 
was that encounter data used to calculate retrospective 
enrollee risk scores were incomplete, leading enrollees to 
appear much healthier in the year-end reconciliation process 
than they were.16 Efforts to resolve these problems consumed 
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substantial staff time and resources at Scripps and the health 
plans, leading all parties to conclude that retrospective cal-
culations of enrollee risk scores would not be viable while 
encounter data still lacked reliability. As a result, Scripps is 
discontinuing its risk-adjustment experiment. Commercial 
HMO contracts coming up for renewal reportedly are being 
renegotiated under standard commercial capitation terms, 
with base rates adjusted only by age, sex, and benefit plan. If 
Scripps indeed suffered from adverse selection in the past on 
its commercial HMO contracts, and continues to do so now, 
it remains to be seen how significant a financial disadvantage 
this return to standard commercial capitation payment might 
represent for the system.
Besides returning to capitation in its contracts with 
commercial health plans, Scripps also has launched its own 
health plan. In August 2015, its application for a full insur-
ance license was approved by the state, and in 2016, Scripps 
Health Plan began offering coverage to Scripps’ own work-
force. This year, the new plan also will begin offering quotes 
to other employers for 2017 coverage. Like many provider-
sponsored health plans, the new plan is likely to focus on the 
mid-sized local employer segment of the market. The plan 
is also likely to enter the Covered California marketplace 
at some future point, but it will not be ready to do so by 
2017, as it must first meet numerous requirements, including 
NCQA accreditation. 
With the market’s two largest systems now both sponsor-
ing their own health plans, along with Kaiser, the impact on 
the market — at least in the near future — is likely to be an 
increase in both price competition and product choices. It 
is in the market segments where these plans will all be com-
peting — the mid-sized employer market and the Covered 
California marketplace — where benefits will most likely be 
concentrated for purchasers and consumers. How sustainable 
those gains are, and how much impact the provider-sponsored 
plans will have in the longer term, depends largely on the 
ability of the systems to continue reducing their cost struc-
tures. This is an issue that looms much larger for Scripps than 
for Sharp, given Scripps’ historically higher costs and greater 
reliance on volume-based, fee-for-service payment. In a sign 
of the cost pressures facing Scripps, the system announced in 
March 2016 plans to eliminate about 100 management and 
administrative positions as part of a broader, ongoing effort to 
reduce operating expenses.17
As Scripps moves toward a population health approach, 
one of its key challenges is developing greater clinical inte-
gration, an area where it lags behind Sharp. With clinical 
information exchange among its clinicians currently ham-
pered by the use of separate, incompatible electronic health 
record (EHR) systems in its inpatient and ambulatory set-
tings, Scripps is making a $500 million investment in a new, 
integrated EHR platform. Still in the design phase, the new 
clinical IT system is scheduled to begin rolling out in early 
2017 and to be completed in 2018. 
Further developing and tightening affiliations with its 
physician network is another key challenge Scripps has 
been working on as part of its population health strategy. 
As described above, Scripps’ physician network encompasses 
multiple IPAs, including the relatively recent alignment with 
Scripps Physicians Medical Group. Those multiple rela-
tionships make it more challenging to pursue a population 
health strategy in contrast to the single, longstanding, very 
tight alignment Sharp has with its IPA, SCMG, which has 
achieved a substantial degree of clinical integration. 
More broadly, Scripps’ strategy of transforming itself into 
a value provider that competes on affordability and takes full 
risk for large patient populations represents a paradigm shift 
for a system whose success was built largely as a high-priced 
provider in a fee-for-service environment. Like Sutter Health 
in Northern California — another high-priced provider now 
pursuing population health — Scripps inevitably will face 
many conflicting incentives internally about how much, and 
how fast, to move away from conventional fee-for-service 
strategies that have served it so well in the past. 
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Providers Expand Commercial ACO Participation  
Despite Reservations
In the last round of the study in 2012, San Diego was among 
the first California markets to see the emergence of commer-
cial ACO collaborations between health plans and providers. 
Both of Sharp’s affiliated physician organizations, SCMG 
and SRS, had begun participating in an ACO with Anthem 
Blue Cross in 2011, and SCMG also had started partnering 
with Aetna in a much smaller ACO in 2012.18 Both ACOs 
were based on a PPO platform and used attribution models 
to assign physicians financial responsibility for individual 
patients. In 2012, SCMG’s patient lives from both ACOs 
totaled about 15,000.
Since then, the number of commercial ACOs involv-
ing Sharp physician organizations has grown to three with 
the recent addition of a United ACO (also based on a PPO 
attribution model). Across all three ACOs, SCMG has about 
27,000 patient lives, and SRS has more than 35,000.19 
Scripps also has begun to participate in commercial ACOs, 
with a Cigna collaboration already in place and another with 
Anthem expected to roll out in late 2016. 
Despite increasing participation in these arrangements, 
providers expressed several reservations and frustrations about 
ACOs. First, they pointed out that sharing risk with health 
plans in ACOs is less advanced for a provider than accept-
ing full risk under capitation, which major systems have 
long done in San Diego. As one system executive observed, 
“[ACO risk sharing] is a step forward if your starting point 
is fee for service . . . but in this market, where you have the 
major [providers] able to take full risk for [patient care], it 
feels like — and it is — a step backward.” Respondents from 
both systems and health plans noted the drawbacks inher-
ent in the shared-savings approach used by ACOs, which 
require the partners to identify new sources of savings over 
time, in contrast to capitation, which allows providers to be 
rewarded consistently from one contract to the next as long 
as they continue to manage care efficiently. In addition, pro-
viders noted the many data and logistical challenges of ACO 
collaborations. While data sharing between health plans 
and providers has improved markedly since ACOs were first 
launched, the patient data currently available to providers for 
attributed ACO lives still are not nearly as comprehensive 
or timely as the data that providers have for their capitated 
patients, according to one physician executive. Care manage-
ment is another key logistical challenge for ACOs, with health 
plans and providers often “treading on each other’s toes” with 
separate programs whose lack of coordination can result in 
costly duplication for the ACO partners, and confusion and 
frustration for patients.
In spite of these limitations, providers continue to explore 
ways to expand their participation in ACOs, largely as a 
means of increasing patient volume. As one physician execu-
tive observed, “However clunky [ACOs] are . . . they allow us 
to reach people who have never been in, and will never be in, 
HMOs. . . . It gives us a chance to capture people who might 
not [otherwise] be our patients.”
Safety Net Responds to Rising Demand with 
Capacity Expansions, Collaborations
Historically, San Diego’s safety net has been considered weak 
in some respects — most notably the limited extent of county 
commitment to and funding for low-income health services 
— but strong in other dimensions, such as the extensive, 
well-established set of community clinics providing relatively 
robust primary care services to low-income residents. As in 
other California communities, the large expansion of Medi-
Cal eligibility under the ACA has strained the capacity of 
safety-net providers to meet increased demand.
As one of the few large California counties not operat-
ing its own hospital, San Diego continues to rely on several 
community hospitals, along with its public academic medical 
center, to provide safety-net inpatient care. Hospitals with 
a disproportionate share of low-income patients include 
UCSD (Hillcrest campus); Scripps Mercy (both Chula Vista 
and Hillcrest campuses); Sharp Grossmont (El Cajon, East 
region); Sharp Chula Vista; and Rady Children’s Hospital. 
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Measured as a proportion of total inpatient discharges for 
low-income patients (defined as Medi-Cal and uninsured), 
Sharp provides the most low-income inpatient care in the 
county (30%), followed by Scripps (21%) and UCSD (13%). 
When low-income discharges are measured as a proportion 
of each system’s total discharges, UCSD has the highest rate 
of low-income care (37%), followed by Prime (36%), Sharp 
(32%), Tri-City (30%), and Scripps (26%).20 
The hospitals providing the highest volumes of safety-net 
care all belong to financially strong systems, but as expected, 
these hospitals tend to have substantially lower operating 
margins than other hospitals in the same systems with more 
favorable payer mixes. In contrast to the other major systems, 
Kaiser’s safety-net inpatient role is largely limited to services 
provided to its own, small population of Medi-Cal enrollees 
(see below). Other providers pointed to this unevenly distrib-
uted Medi-Cal burden as an unfair competitive advantage 
for Kaiser, with one system executive calling it “an ‘unlevel’ 
playing field that’s a huge, huge thorn in [the] sides [of the 
other systems].” 
Over the past few years, San Diego’s already extensive 
group of community clinics has continued to grow from a 
total of 12 full FQHCs and one look-alike in 2012 to 15 
full FQHCs currently.21 The number of clinic sites has also 
increased, with some of the largest FQHC organizations 
expanding the most. Family Health Centers of San Diego — 
not only the largest FQHC in the county, but also one of the 
largest in the state — now operates 23 clinic sites, includ-
ing three mobile medical clinics, and plans to add three more 
clinics within the next year. Other large FQHCs include 
San Ysidro Health Center (16 sites); North County Health 
Services (10 sites); Neighborhood Healthcare (8 sites); and 
La Maestra Community Health Centers and Borrego Health 
(5 sites each).22 
San Diego is one of only two California counties to 
organize Medi-Cal managed care through the Geographic 
Managed Care (GMC) model, with the state contracting with 
multiple managed care plans and paying each on a capitated 
basis. Under this model, there is no public, county-operated 
health plan. The five plans currently serving the market repre-
sent a mix of local and national, and nonprofit and for-profit, 
entities. The two largest by far are local nonprofit Community 
Health Group (with 40% of total enrollment) and national 
for-profit Molina Healthcare (31%). The remainder of the 
Medi-Cal market is split among Health Net (11%), Care1st 
(11%), and Kaiser (8%).23 Two more plans, Aetna and 
United, are slated to enter the market in 2017.24
The California Department of Health Care Services’ 
Medi-Cal Managed Care Performance Dashboard shows 
a large performance gap between Kaiser and the other four 
plans.25 Kaiser, whose members have access to exactly the same 
care network as its commercial members, outperformed all 
Medi-Cal plans in California, with a perfect score of 100 on 
a composite measure of quality and satisfaction. San Diego’s 
largest plan, Community Health Group, earned a score of 60 
— the state average — while the remaining three plans scored 
below average. 
However, Kaiser remains the plan with the lowest enroll-
ment in the county because of its longstanding policy to limit 
its Medi-Cal enrollment to people who meet strict eligibility 
criteria: either having been Kaiser members themselves within 
the last 12 months or having an immediate family member 
who has been a Kaiser member during that period. Not only 
does this requirement curb Kaiser’s total Medi-Cal enroll-
ment but it also gives Kaiser favorable selection (healthier 
enrollees, with fewer complex or costly needs, than average). 
People able to meet Kaiser’s eligibility criteria are significantly 
less likely to be homeless or have serious behavioral health 
issues, for example, than the average enrollee who became eli-
gible for Medi-Cal under the ACA expansion. 
New Medi-Cal Enrollees Face Large Gaps in Behavioral 
Health, Specialty Care
San Diego’s Medi-Cal managed care enrollment soared from 
fewer than 350,000 at the end of 2013 to more than 670,000 
by the end of 2015, a 92% increase over the two-year period. 
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The first wave of new enrollment under the ACA expansion 
in early 2014 included about 50,000 enrollees transitioned 
from the county Low Income Health Program (LIHP) (see 
below); most respondents said this transition went relatively 
smoothly. Most FQHCs participated in the county LIHP 
primary care network and were able to keep a large majority 
of their assigned LIHP enrollees once those enrollees gained 
Medi-Cal coverage in January 2014. Medi-Cal managed 
care enrollment continued growing significantly in 2015, 
but unlike many early enrollees who were highly motivated 
to obtain coverage (described by one clinic director as “the 
low-hanging fruit”), people who enrolled later have tended 
to require much more intensive outreach efforts to convince 
them to apply and more support services to help them com-
plete successful applications for coverage.
The surge in enrollment since 2014 has put pressure 
on Medi-Cal managed care plans and safety-net providers 
to meet the increased demand for a wide variety of services 
(primary, specialty, and behavioral health care) in a timely 
manner. Most plans rely primarily on FQHCs to form the 
backbone of their primary care networks (the exception being 
Kaiser, which uses its own large network of PCPs and ambu-
latory facilities). In preparation for the Medi-Cal expansion, 
many FQHCs — especially the largest ones — had sub-
stantially expanded their capacity to handle larger patient 
volumes. These expansions involved expanding hours as well 
as opening new clinic sites. 
However, several FQHCs reported that recruiting enough 
clinicians — particularly PCPs — has posed a major chal-
lenge, especially in a market where the clinics compete against 
large groups affiliated with financially strong systems. To 
attract more recruits, several FQHCs raised salaries signifi-
cantly. The largest FQHC, Family Health Centers, launched 
its own family medicine residency program, which now brings 
in 6 new residents each year, for a total of 18 residents at 
any given time. Another FQHC, Neighborhood Healthcare, 
recruits PCPs with board certifications in both family medi-
cine and psychiatry, an approach several other clinics are also 
trying, but with mixed success given the limited pool of PCPs 
with these credentials.
The capacity pressures facing community clinics stem 
not just from pure volume growth but also from the more 
challenging needs of newly eligible Medi-Cal patients com-
pared to the traditional pre-expansion Medi-Cal population. 
Not only are new enrollees more likely to have multiple and 
complex health problems but many also have broader social 
service issues like homelessness. The leadership of one clinic 
described being “unprepared to take on this vastly more chal-
lenging population” because clinic services had been geared 
primarily toward traditional Medi-Cal “mothers and kids.” 
Several FQHCs were better prepared, thanks to a longstand-
ing focus on integrating behavioral health into primary care; 
these clinics developed considerable in-house resources and 
expertise to deal with mild to moderate behavioral health 
issues. For example, since the late 2000s, Family Health 
Centers (FHC) has embedded mental health services into 
most of its primary care clinic sites. Every primary care visit 
includes mental health screening, and FHC clinics handle 
between 125 and 200 mental health visits a day in-house. 
Neighborhood Healthcare (NHC) also has integrated behav-
ioral health into its primary care sites. In addition to the 
double-certified PCPs mentioned earlier, NHC has a staff 
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and marriage and family 
therapists who work closely with PCPs to do “warm hand-
offs,” where the PCP directly introduces the patient to the 
behavioral health provider during a medical visit as a way to 
establish trust and rapport and to reduce any stigma or other 
barriers to receiving behavioral health care. 
However, even some clinics with strong behavioral health 
capacity reported being overwhelmed by both the volume 
and the severity of mental health and substance abuse prob-
lems among new Medi-Cal enrollees. Under California law, 
Medi-Cal managed care plans are responsible for treating 
mild to moderate behavioral health cases, while responsibility 
for severe cases rests with the county. As in other communi-
ties, the various parties responsible for Medi-Cal behavioral 
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health in San Diego “struggle mightily to make that dis-
tinction between what’s moderate and what’s severe,” and 
coordination among the county, the managed care plans, and 
safety-net providers has been “spotty,” according to one clinic 
director.
Low payment rates have long resulted in a shortage of spe-
cialists willing to treat Medi-Cal patients in San Diego. This 
dearth of available specialists was exacerbated by increased 
demand following the ACA expansion. One Medi-Cal 
health plan executive explained why, in the face of increasing 
demand, the plan had not expanded its physician network: 
“The [community] physicians who were going to take Medi-
Cal were already contracted with our plan.” A clinic director 
observed that there were reasons beyond low payment rates 
for the specialist shortage in the safety net: “Specialists in 
the community really don’t like our patients. They are hard 
to serve . . . and [many] are no-shows” for appointments. 
Specialties highlighted as having particularly short supply 
relative to need include neurology, orthopedics, urology, 
and gynecologic oncology. As a result, staff at a large FQHC 
often resort to directing patients to a hospital ED when no 
community specialist can be found to take an urgent referral, 
according to that FQHC’s director.
Overall, San Diego did not experience the dramatic surge 
in hospital ED use seen in some other California communi-
ties, at least in the first year of the Medi-Cal expansion. In 
2014, total ED visits in San Diego increased only somewhat 
faster than they had in previous years (5% growth in 2014 
vs. 2.5% to 3.5% growth in each of the previous five years). 
This was consistent with the fact that hospital executives in 
San Diego did not cite ED capacity constraints as one of 
the top pressures facing their systems, in contrast to hospital 
executives in some other communities. The hospitals with the 
highest increases in ED volume included three Sharp facili-
ties: Chula Vista (9% growth in 2014), Grossmont (9%), and 
Memorial (8%).26 However, some hospital executives noted 
that ED visits continued climbing significantly in 2015, 
raising capacity concerns at some facilities.
FQHCs Collaborating More Among Themselves  
and with Hospitals
Competition and lack of collaboration among community 
clinics have long been perceived to be problems in San Diego. 
However, that had begun to change by the time the last study 
was conducted in 2012, as many FQHCs were starting to 
step up their collaborations through the San Diego Council 
of Community Clinics (recently renamed Health Center 
Partners). This consortium provides coordination and support 
for activities such as funding, outreach, specialty referral, and 
implementation of health information technology. However, 
the reach and impact of the consortium has been limited by 
the fact that the largest FQHC, Family Health Centers, is not 
a member.
In a key development announced March 2016, 12 FQHC 
members of Health Center Partners have formed a new part-
nership, Integrated Health Partners of Southern California 
(IHP), to launch an integrated care network for their com-
bined 500,000 patients a year.27 IHP will function as an IPA, 
contracting with all Medi-Cal managed care plans (except 
Kaiser) as a single entity, replacing all the separate contracts 
each FQHC currently holds with the Medi-Cal plans. The 
first IHP contract with Molina, the second-largest plan, goes 
into effect May 2016, and contracts with other plans will 
follow.
The capitated payments that IHP is negotiating on behalf 
of its clinic members will not cover all professional services, 
but rather, a smaller bundle of services described as “primary 
care plus,” covering the services “provided within the four 
walls of the clinic,” which often include services such as basic 
behavioral health. Although the payments from health plans 
are capitated, FQHCs are not yet truly assuming financial 
risk for the Medi-Cal or Medicare services covered by the 
capitated payment, because the FQHCs remain eligible to 
receive wraparound payments from the state in a year-end 
reconciliation process aimed at bringing their total reim-
bursement up to the cost-based payment level to which their 
FQHC status entitles them.28 Because these wraparound 
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payments effectively protect FQHCs from most risk except 
for cash-flow risk, one respondent described the current 
capitation-plus-wraparound arrangement as “training wheels 
for FQHCs to practice taking on risk.” (However, another 
respondent noted that providing care to the uninsured popu-
lation has given FQHCs considerable experience in assuming 
financial risk for patient care.)29
Over the next few years, California is expected to replace 
the current enhanced, cost-based Medi-Cal reimbursement 
approach with true capitation for FQHCs. With that tran-
sition slated to begin with a 2017 pilot program in selected 
markets, the coming of capitation is regarded as inevitable, 
and IHP is a collaborative effort by the majority of San Diego 
FQHCs to prepare for that change. One of the key ways in 
which IHP aims to improve the efficiency and quality of care 
provided by member clinics is by collecting and sharing a 
rich set of clinical data. The member clinics have agreed to 
share those data on an unblinded basis, allowing the group to 
identify weaker performers and help those clinics boost their 
performance. Among IHP’s top priorities is providing support 
to member clinics with less-advanced patient-centered medical 
home capabilities to help them develop those capabilities. 
IHP represents, by far, the most ambitious collaborative 
effort in the San Diego safety net to date. It is too early to 
tell what impact it may eventually have on FQHC quality, 
efficiency, and ability to assume financial risk. While member 
clinics will have strong incentives to work together to boost 
their collective performance, one clinic director cautioned 
that because clinics are used to operating as “fiercely inde-
pendent organizations [that] all have very different histories 
. . . [and] also tend to treat different patient populations,” 
productive collaboration among clinics — and the ability of 
IHP to act as an integrated entity — will face challenges. 
Over the past few years, FQHCs have been increasingly 
collaborating with hospitals as well. However, one safety-
net respondent described these joint efforts as “a patchwork, 
. . . a multitude of small [collaborations]” that tend to 
form between single hospitals and clinics operating in that 
hospital’s service area. Some major hospitals with large low-
income populations — most notably Scripps Mercy and 
Sharp Chula Vista — have partnerships with multiple clinics. 
For example, Family Health Centers recently built a clinic site 
next to Scripps Mercy’s Hillcrest campus to provide primary 
care for hospital patients who lack an established primary 
care provider. That arrangement represents one of the most 
common collaborations between FQHCs and hospitals, with 
the latter seeking not just to relieve ED capacity constraints, 
but also to prevent avoidable readmissions by linking patients 
to primary care. Scripps Mercy and UCSD also participate in 
a three-way partnership with another FQHC, San Ysidro, for 
a family medicine residency program, with UCSD providing 
the education and training, Scripps Mercy the funding and 
inpatient facilities, and San Ysidro the outpatient facilities. 
Hospitals and FQHCs both perceived the need for more 
collaborations overall between the two types of providers, and 
the need to forge better, more productive collaborations — 
but both cited barriers to achieving those goals. According to 
one hospital executive, a tentative partnership with a neigh-
boring FQHC stalled when it became clear that the FQHC 
would have trouble mustering enough primary care capacity 
to adequately staff a proposed new primary care clinic to be 
located near the hospital’s ED. The clinic perspective was cap-
tured by an FQHC director who observed, “The hospitals are 
not used to the world of clinics . . . and many don’t know how 
to partner with us . . . [but] they realize if they don’t do some-
thing different so that patients can be seen in an ambulatory 
setting, they get a lot of re-treats and readmissions . . . [so] 
hospitals are coming to the table more [since the ACA expan-
sion]. . . . Hospitals are sharing their data more, and they are 
very interested in what we can do together. It’s a new day.”
County Continues Playing Active Coordination Role
Historically, San Diego County has demonstrated limited 
commitment to the health care safety net, with the County 
Board of Supervisors focusing on keeping county health 
spending low overall and preventing undocumented 
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immigrants in particular from receiving any subsidized ser-
vices. The county has not owned a hospital since the 1980s, 
and it does not operate any primary care clinics. Behavioral 
health is the one major area where the county directly pro-
vides health services to low-income residents. It owns and 
operates the Psychiatric Hospital of San Diego County, which 
provides inpatient care and crisis intervention for people with 
serious mental illness. The county also operates several of its 
own mental health clinics, as well as contracts with commu-
nity-based providers to provide additional outpatient services 
to low-income patients with serious mental health and sub-
stance use disorders. 
As reported in the last round of this study, the leader-
ship team that has directed the county Health and Human 
Services Agency since the late 2000s has played an increas-
ingly proactive role in efforts to improve health and health 
care in San Diego. HHSA’s Live Well San Diego (LWSD) ini-
tiative, at first a 10-year plan with the broad aim of improving 
the health and well-being of San Diego residents, now pro-
vides the framework for developing the county operating 
budget and for collaborating with public and private part-
ners on federal grants and other joint efforts. LWSD also was 
used as a guide for designing care delivery in the LIHP, which 
consisted of a network of FQHCs serving as patient-centered 
medical homes. 
The initiatives on which the county is collaborating with 
providers and other local organizations include joint efforts 
that extend well beyond the safety net. One such initiative 
is the San Diego Care Transitions Partnership (SDCTP), a 
collaboration among the county and four systems — Scripps, 
Sharp, UCSD, and Palomar — aimed at reducing hospi-
tal readmissions for high-risk Medicare patients discharged 
from hospitals into the community. (As a group, the four 
systems provide care for more than 90% of Medicare fee-for-
service patients in San Diego.) SDCTP is the largest among 
27 programs in CMS’s Community-Based Care Transitions 
Program, and it has been very successful at reducing readmis-
sions and costs for CMS since its 2013 launch. Although CMS 
is likely to discontinue the program nationwide in late 2016 
to focus on alternative payment models, the local participants 
in SDCTP have agreed to continue some of the program’s 
most effective interventions. Most notably, the county will 
continue to provide a bundle of “care enhancement” social 
services to a subset of frail patients deemed most at risk for 
readmissions, with funding provided by the four systems to 
replace CMS funding. One respondent observed that partici-
pating in SDCTP had shown the systems how cost-effective 
the targeted provision of social services could be in prevent-
ing readmissions and other costly outcomes; as a result, the 
systems became willing to pay the county to provide these 
services to some of their most at-risk patients.
Another key collaborative effort for the county is Cal 
MediConnect, a three-year demonstration in seven California 
counties to provide coordinated care for patients dually eli-
gible for Medicare and Medicaid across a continuum of care 
settings, including medical, behavioral health, long term 
care, and home health. In Cal MediConnect, the county 
collaborates with health plans and community-based orga-
nizations. Unlike SDCTP, however, the results have proved 
disappointing: Enrollment in the program has been low, and 
disenrollment has been high. That pattern has been evident 
not just in San Diego but across all Cal MediConnect sites. 
Dual eligibles have shown great reluctance to change the 
regular providers — particularly the PCPs — they already 
have under Medicare fee for service. Many of these provid-
ers declined to participate in the Cal MediConnect network 
because of low payment rates. 
The county continues to play an active coordination role 
in behavioral health issues. It sponsors an annual summit 
on integrating behavioral health and primary care. As noted 
above, the county is responsible for dealing with severe behav-
ioral health issues for low-income residents, and it has been 
working with Medi-Cal managed care plans, community 
clinics, hospitals, and others to determine which enrollees fall 
into severe versus moderate categories, and to improve care 
transitions. These coordination efforts “are not going terribly 
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well yet” and face challenges related to inadequate funding 
and lack of mental health and substance abuse resources 
overall in the community, according to one respondent. 
While acknowledging the coordination role HHSA plays 
in behavioral health, respondents from hospital systems 
expressed frustration about the adverse impact that the coun-
ty’s limited overall funding of behavioral health has had on 
their own systems. “When the county doesn’t provide enough 
psych beds, those patients who should be [treated at county 
mental health facilities] end up in our ERs. . . . It’s the wrong 
setting for them; it’s very disruptive for our staff and our other 
patients . . . and very costly for the hospital. We’re seeing the 
county shifting a big part of its obligations onto private pro-
viders,” asserted one hospital executive.
Limited Care Options for the Residually Uninsured
There has never been significant support among San Diego 
County’s elected officials or residents for using county funds 
to provide health services for undocumented immigrants. 
Historically, San Diego’s County Medical Services program 
(CMSP) for medically indigent adults has maintained more 
stringent eligibility standards than many other California 
counties. It has been open only to US citizens and legal 
immigrants with incomes up to 165% of federal poverty who 
have an immediate medical need. CMSP coverage has never 
encompassed primary care; instead, it has been limited to hos-
pital stays and follow-up visits. These stringent standards still 
apply to the program, which has now shrunk dramatically in 
the wake of the Medi-Cal expansion. At its peak, CMSP had 
served many thousands of low-income adults annually, but 
over the past year, fewer than 400 people reportedly received 
services from the program.
Many of San Diego’s remaining uninsured residents are 
undocumented immigrants. When they receive care within 
the county, it is typically at community clinics and hospi-
tal EDs; some also continue to cross the border into Mexico 
for care, according to respondents. However, many undocu-
mented immigrants go without needed care, or delay seeking 
care until their medical conditions become severe. As one 
hospital executive observed, “When [undocumented immi-
grants] show up at the ER, they tend to be in bad shape.” 
Issues to Track
▶▶ Will San Diego’s large hospital systems be able to maintain 
strong financial performance in the face of cost pressures 
from public and private payers? If their operating margins 
erode, what will be the implications for the inpatient 
safety-net roles played by these systems? 
▶▶ How well will the county’s smaller hospitals weather their 
current struggles? Will these smaller hospitals find ways 
to remain viable as independent institutions, or will they 
face closure or acquisition? What role will state seismic 
standards play in these hospitals’ future prospects? 
▶▶ How effective will the market’s two largest systems be in 
implementing their population health strategies? How 
committed, and how successful, will Scripps prove to be 
in its return to commercial capitation? To what extent will 
adverse selection prove to be an issue for Scripps in its 
commercial risk contracts?
▶▶ Will network-model HMOs continue losing ground to 
high-deductible PPOs and Kaiser HMOs in the com-
mercial market? To what extent will the health plans 
sponsored by Sharp and Scripps be able to reverse — or at 
least reduce — that trend? How much impact will compe-
tition from these provider-sponsored plans have on prices 
and product choices faced by employers and individual 
consumers? 
▶▶ Will the region’s IPAs find ways to keep independent 
practice viable, particularly for primary care physicians? 
To what extent will SharpCare’s new, smaller-scale 
employment model successfully emerge as an alterna-
tive to existing models of primary care practice? Will 
other systems follow suit in sponsoring new primary care 
models?
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▶▶ To what extent will safety-net providers be able to meet 
increased demand resulting from the Medi-Cal expansion 
by continuing to expand capacity? Will FQHCs manage 
to recruit sufficient numbers of PCPs and other clinicians? 
Will viable strategies be identified for addressing access 
gaps for specialty care and behavioral health care?
▶▶ To what extent will the new partnership among FQHCs 
succeed in improving efficiency and quality and increas-
ing the FQHCs’ collective ability to assume financial risk? 
Will collaborations between hospitals and FQHCs con-
tinue to expand, and will they prove effective in providing 
more appropriate, less costly care for low-income people?
ENDNOTES
 1. Fallbrook Hospital, a small district hospital in the far northern portion 
of the county, stopped providing inpatient services in 2014. The 
downtown Escondido campus of Palomar Medical Center stopped 
providing inpatient services in mid-2015.
 2. Scripps’ four hospitals are spread across five campuses.
 3. Annual Financial Data, California Office of Statewide Planning and 
Development (OSHPD), 2014. Data reflect each hospital system’s fiscal 
year. Data on inpatient discharges and market shares exclude Rady 
Children’s Hospital.
 4. State reporting requirements make OSHPD financial data (reported 
above) inconsistent with accounting guidelines and hospital systems’ 
audited financial statements. Reports issued by credit rating agencies 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s showed 2014 operating margins by 
Scripps and Sharp to be 6.0% and 7.8%, respectively.
 5. In previous years, UCSD’s audited financial data diverged significantly 
from OSHPD data (e.g., in 2010, OSHPD reported negative operating 
margins, while UCSD audited financials showed a solidly positive 
margin).
 6. The contract between Kaiser and Palomar has a five-year term and is 
renewed on a rolling basis every year.
 7. Chris Jennewein, “Tri-City Medical Center Appoints New CEO from Its 
Ranks,” Times of San Diego, March 21, 2016, timesofsandiego.com.
 8. Paul Sisson, “Scripps Health Expands with Clinics, Insurance Plans,”  
San Diego Union-Tribune, December 1, 2015,  
www.sandiegouniontribune.com.
 9. Because California’s corporate practice of medicine law prohibits 
hospitals from directly employing physicians, some hospitals sponsor 
medical foundations as a way to align with physicians. Under a medical 
foundation model, physicians either contract with the foundation 
through an affiliated IPA or belong to a medical group that contracts 
exclusively with the foundation through a professional services 
arrangement. University of California hospitals, county hospitals, and 
some nonprofit organizations such as community clinics are among the 
entities allowed to employ physicians directly, through exceptions to the 
corporate practice of medicine prohibition.
 10. Paul Sisson, “Medicare Pay to Increase for SD Docs,” San Diego Union-
Tribune, March 14, 2016, www.sandiegouniontribune.com.
 11. MACRA’s Quality Payment Program has two paths: the Merit-Based 
Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment Models 
(APMs). The vast majority of physicians will be paid under MIPS; small 
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* Orange County was added to this study in 2015; the research team had familiarity with this market through the prior Community Tracking Study conducted by the Center for Studying Health System 
Change (HSC), which merged with Mathematica in January 2014.
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